Abstract. This is a survey of work on set-theoretical invariance criteria for logicality. It begins with a review of the Tarski-Sher thesis in terms, first, of permutation invariance over a given domain and then of isomorphism invariance across domains, both characterized by McGee in terms of definability in the language L ∞,∞ . It continues with a review of critiques of the Tarski-Sher thesis, and a proposal in response to one of those critiques via homomorphism invariance. That has quite divergent characterization results depending on its formulation, one in terms of FOL, the other by Bonnay in terms of L ∞,∞ , both without equality. From that we move on to a survey of Bonnay's work on similarity relations between structures and his results that single out invariance with respect to potential isomorphism among all such. Turning to the critique that calls for sameness of meaning of a logical operation across domains, the paper continues with a result showing that the isomorphism invariant operations that are absolutely definable with respect to KPU−Inf are exactly those definable in full FOL; this makes use of an old theorem of Manders. The concluding section is devoted to a critical discussion of the arguments for set-theoretical criteria for logicality.
cardinality, I had proposed consideration in [11] of the homomorphism invariant operations (in a strong sense); it was shown op. cit. that the operations that are definable from monadic homomorphic invariant operations are exactly those expressible in the first-order predicate calculus L ω,ω without equality. However, Bonnay [6] , [7] later characterized the operations that are outright homomorphism invariant as just those definable in the language L ∞,∞ without equality. Bonnay went on to consider operations that are invariant under other kinds of similarity relations. His main results distinguish potential isomorphism (Iso p ) among all such relations, and that has led him to propose Iso p -invariance as the criterion for logicality; it turns out that the operations invariant under potential isomorphism go somewhere beyond those definable in the language L ∞,ω .
The Tarski-Sher thesis and McGee's results concerning it are reviewed in sec. 2, then my critiques of it and result for homomorphism invariant operations are reviewed in sec. 3, and Bonnay's work is described in sec. 4 . Following that, I propose in sec. 5 an explanation of what constitutes the same operation across arbitrary domains in terms of those that are uniformly definable within the language of set theory. Moreover, in order to meet the second critique above, one should restrict to definitions that are absolute with respect to a system of set theory that makes no assumptions about the size of the universe. Specifically, I look at operations on relational structures that are definable in an absolute way relative to KPU−Inf, i.e. Kripke-Platek set theory with urelements and without the Axiom of Infinity. It is shown to follow from an old result of Manders [19] (reproved in Väänänen [30] ) that the operations in question on structures whose domains consist of urelements are exactly those expressible in the ordinary first-order predicate calculus with equality. The aguments in favor of set-theoretical invariance criteria for logicality are discussed critically in the concluding section 6; despite the attraction of various of the results that have been obtained, my overall conclusion is that none of the set-theoretical invariance proposals on offer provide a sufficiently convincing criterion for logicality in their own right. 1 Corcoran, but it did not appear until three years after his death in 1983. Tarski (ii) The only binary relations between individuals which are logical are the empty relation, the universal relation, the identity relation and its complement.
(iii) At the next level, i.e. classes of classes of individuals, Tarski mentions as logical notions those given by cardinality properties of classes such as "that a class consists of three elements, or four elements...that it is finite, or infinite⎯these are logical notions, and are essentially the only logical notions on this level." (iv) Finally, among relations between classes (of individuals) Tarski points to several which are "well known to those of you who have studied the elements of logic" such as "inclusion between classes, disjointness of two classes, overlapping of two classes," and so on.
Tarski did not attempt to give examples of logical notions in higher types than those in (iii) and (iv), though, as explained in [11] , his proposal makes sense for objects in the finite relational type structure over D, where the objects at each level are relations of one or more arguments between objects of lower levels. Nor did Tarski raise the question of characterizing the logical notions, and more generally of the operations on members of the type structure that are invariant under arbitrary permutations. This is understandable in view of the general audience to which his lecture was addressed. The first such characterization was provided by McGee [21] , who showed that an operation is logical according to Tarski's permutation-invariance criterion if and only if it is definable in the language L ∞,∞ ; this is the language defined in set theory which allows⎯in addition to the operation of negation⎯conjunctions and disjunctions of any cardinality, together with universal and existential quantification over a sequence of variables of any cardinality.
For simplicity in the following, and as is common in discussions of logicality, we shall restrict attention to the question of what are logical notions Q of type level 2, i.e. relations between relations R between individuals. 2 The letter 'Q' is used here for such because logical notions in Tarski's sense at this level over a given domain D are the restriction to D of a generalization of quantifiers due to Lindström [17] . Given R = (R 1 ,…,R n ) with R i a k i -ary relation between elements of D (k i a non-zero natural number)
we write Q D (R 1 ,…,R n ) or Q D ( (ii) if ϕ is a formula then ¬ϕ is a formula;
(iii) if Φ is any non-empty set of formulas then ∨ϕ [ ϕ ∈ Φ ] is a formula;
(iv) if ϕ is a formula and U is any non-empty set of variables then (∃U)ϕ is a formula.
Given a domain D, an interpretation R = (R 1 , …, R n ) in D of the predicate symbols P 1 , …, P n , resp., a formula ϕ of L ∞, ∞, , and an assignment s to the free variables of ϕ in D, one inductively defines as usual
When ϕ is a sentence, this is simply written Enumerate D as {d α : α < κ}, and W as {x a : α < κ} ∪ {y}. The x α act as formal surrogates of the d α . Let ψ R be the diagram of R under this association together with ¬(x α = x β ) for each α < β, and then take χ R to be the formula which says that there exist x a (α < κ) such that ψ R holds and such that each y in the domain is one of the x α . Finally, take ϕ to be the disjunction of all the χ R over all sequences R such that Q D (R) holds; note that this final disjunction may be of cardinality as large as 2 κ , and the longest quantifier sequences in ϕ are of length at least κ. However, on an equinumerous domain containing at least one rich and one poor person, the operation $ is not permutation invariant, by taking A to be a singleton of one of these.
Thus McGee is led to consider an extension of the permutation invariance criterion for logicality as proposed by Sher [26] : by the Tarski THEOREM 2 (McGee [21] ). An operation Q across domains is a logical operation according to the Tarski-Sher thesis iff for each cardinal κ ≠ 0 there is a formula ϕ κ of L ∞,∞ which describes the action of Q on domains of cardinality κ.
More specifically, one can take ϕ κ to be the formula constructed for the proof of Theorem 1 for any domain D of cardinality κ. Whatever such ϕ κ is taken, in order to obtain a single definition of the operation Q across arbitrary domains, one must take something like the disjunction⎯over the class of all non-zero cardinals κ⎯of ϕ κ conjoined with the sentence expressing that there are exactly κ elements in the domain. This goes well beyond L ∞,∞ as ordinarily conceived.
Critiques of the Tarski-Sher thesis; homomorphism invariant operations.
McGee's results lay bare the character of logical operations according to the Tarski-Sher thesis. In my article "Logic, logics and logicism" [11] , I raised three basic criticisms of it:
I. The thesis assimilates logic to mathematics, more specifically to set theory.
II. The set-theoretical notions involved in explaining the semantics of L ∞,∞ are not robust.
III. No natural explanation is given by it of what constitutes the same logical operation
over arbitrary basic domains.
The first of these, also referred to as the "overgeneration problem", speaks for itself, given McGee's results, but it will evidently depend on one's gut feelings about the nature of logic as to whether this is considered objectionable or not. For Sher, to take one example, that is no problem. Indeed, she avers that:
The bounds of logic, on my view, are the bounds of mathematical reasoning. Any higher-order mathematical predicate or relation can function as a logical term, provided it is introduced in the right way into the syntactic-semantic apparatus of first-order logic. (Sher [26] , pp. xii-xiii, italics mine) 3 What that "right way" is for Sher, is spelled out in a series of syntactic/semantic conditions A-E (op. cit. pp. 54-55), of which the crucial ones are the "first-order"
condition A⎯that a logical operation be of type-level at most 2⎯and condition E, which is that for invariance under bijections. The paradigms of condition A are the cardinality quantifiers of Mostowski [23] and, more generally, the generalized quantifiers of Lindström [17] , where the bound variables range over individuals of the domain. But note that despite the appearance of this being limited to first-order quantification, L ∞,∞ also accomodates second-order quantification as a logical operation across domains (in the Tarski-Sher sense). This is seen as follows. First, given formulas ψ(X) and θ(x) of this language, where X is a second-order variable, by ψ({x: θ(x)}) is meant the result of substituting θ(t) for each occurrence of an atomic formula t ∈ X in ψ. Thus, on a domain of cardinality κ, (∀X)ψ(X) is equivalent to the statement ϕ κ that there exist κ elements x α which are distinct and exhaustive of the domain, and are such that
holds. (Again, we require a conjunction of cardinality 2 κ in this formula.) So, from Theorem 2 above, the restriction to bound first order variables is only apparent, and
Sher's condition A is not set-theoretically restrictive. By a trick similar to the preceding, we can quantify over arbitrary relations on the domain, and then say that they are functions, etc. In particular, we can express the Continuum Hypothesis and many other substantial mathematical propositions as logically determinate statements on the TarskiSher thesis. Of course, if one follows Tarski by allowing consideration of invariant notions in all finite types, the assimilation of logic to set theory is patent on his thesis, without needing to invoke infinite formulas at all. But insofar as one or the other version of the thesis requires the existence of set-theoretical entities of a special kind, or at least of their determinate properties, it is evident that we have thereby transcended logic as the arena of universal notions independent of "what there is".
The critique II is in a way subsidiary to that in I. The notion of "robustness" for set-theoretical concepts is vague, but the idea is that if logical notions are at all to be explicated set-theoretically, they should have the same meaning independent of the exact extent of the set-theoretical universe. For example, they should give equivalent results in the constructible sets and in forcing-generic extensions. Gödel's well known concept of absoluteness provides a necessary criterion for such notions, and when applied to operations defined in L ∞,∞ , considerably restricts those that meet this test. For example, the quantifier "there exist uncountably many x" would not be logical according to this restriction, since the property of being uncountable is not absolute. My proposed alternative to the Tarski-Sher thesis in sec. 5 below will hinge directly on a restriction to absolute notions.
At first, critique III was for me perhaps the strongest reason for rejecting the In the end (though perhaps more for other reasons), McGee accepted the TarskiSher thesis as a necessary condition for an operation across domains to count as logical, but not a sufficient one. I agree completely, and believe that if there is to be an explication of the notion of a logical operation in set-theoretical/semantical terms, it has to be one which shows how the way an operation behaves when applied over one domain D connects naturally with how it behaves over any other domain D ′ . I made a first step in that direction in [11] , where I proposed a notion of (strong) homomorphism invariance as To explain the sense of λ-definability that is intended in this statement, consider for example the operation Q(P, R, S) defined for unary P and binary R and S in FOL -by the
which is equivalent to
Then its λ-definition is given in terms of the operations of negation (N), conjunction (C) and existential quantification (E) and the characteristic functions p, r, s of P, R, S respectively by N(E(λx[C(p(x),N(E(λyE(λzC(r(x,y),s(x,z))))]).
The reader is referred to [11] for the proof of Independently of such examples, one immediate criticism of the homomorphisminvariance criterion for logicality is that it excludes the identity relation, which is ordinarily counted as a part of FOL. Actually, that is a controversial matter. See, for example, the discussion by Quine of that question in his Philosophy of Logic (Quine [25] , pp. 61 ff). On the one hand, he says that it "seems fitting" that the predicate of = is to be counted with predicates such as < and ∈ as part of mathematics and not of logic. On the other hand, he gives three arguments for counting = as part of logic. The first is the completeness of the logic of the first-order predicate calculus with equality , the second is the "universality" of =, and the third is the possibility of "simulating" = in a language L containing finitely many predicate symbols; by that he means its explicit definition from those predicates to satisfy the condition of identity of indiscernibles.
Finally, as pointed out to me by Bonnay, it is hard to see how identity could be determined to be logical or not by a set-theoretical invariance criterion of the sort considered here, since either it is presumed in the very notion of invariance itself that is employed⎯as is the case with invariance under isomorphism or one of the partial isomorphism relations considered in the next section⎯or it is eliminated from consideration as is the case with invariance under homomorphism.
4.
Invariance with respect to similarity relations; Bonnay's work. As mentioned above, it has been shown by Bonnay that the operations in general that are homomorphism invariant go far beyond those definable in FOL. The result is stated in his paper [7] , but a proof is not given there; instead the reader is referred back to his dissertation: Basic examples of such are isomorphism and strong homomorphism as above. But
Bonnay also considers a number of others, including α-isomorphism and potential isomorphism, defined by Karp [15] as follows:
An α-isomorphism I from M = (D, R) to M′ = (D′, R′) is a sequence I 0 ⊇I 1 ⊇….⊇I β ⊇….⊇I α such that (i) I α is non-empty, (ii) for any β ≤ α, I β is a set of partial isomorphisms f between these two structures with dom(f)⊆ D and rng(f) ⊆D′, and (iii) if β+1≤ α then for any f ∈I β+1 and x in D (resp. y in D′) there exists g in I β with f ⊆ g and x ∈dom(g) (resp. y ∈rng(g)). We write M ∼ α M′ if there exists such an α-isomorphism;
the similarity relation in this case is denoted Iso α .
A potential isomorphism I between M = (D, R) and M′ = (D′, R′) is a non-empty collection of partial isomorphisms such that for each f ∈ I and x ∈ D (resp. y ∈ D) there exists g ∈I with f ⊆ g and x ∈dom(g) (resp. y ∈rng(g)). We write M ∼ p M′ if there exists such an I, and the similarity relation in this case is denoted Iso p .
The similarity relations are partially ordered by S ≤ S′ iff S′ ⊆S. The smallest S w.r.t. ≤ is the universal relation Univ between structures of the same signature; where there are no constant symbols, this agrees with Iso 0 . For any α,
where Iso is the relation of being isomorphic; the strong homomorphism relation is incomparable with Iso p . It is a familiar result due to Fraïssé [13] that two structures are elementarily equivalent in L ω,ω (= FOL) just in case they are in the Iso ω relation. Karp [15] obtained analogous results for the languages L ∞,ω whose formulas φ are generated by arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions and closed under ordinary quantification, i.e.
formation of ∀xφ and ∃xφ for any variable x. One defines the quantifier rank of φ, qr(φ), in a natural way. Then Karp's theorems are that for limit α, two structures are in the Iso α relation if and only if they satisfy the same sentences φ for which qr(φ) < α, and two structures are in the Iso p relation if and only they satisfy the same sentences of L ∞,ω .
The class of operations Q across domains that are invariant under a given similarity relation S is denoted by Inv(S). Bonnay's main result characterizes the similarity relation Iso p in two different ways in the ≤ relation. The first of these makes use of a natural additional criterion for logicality, namely that any operation definable from the operations in Inv(S) should already be invariant under S. We can explain this notion of definability by setting up a language L S containing a generalized quantifier symbol Q for each Q invariant under S, with the semantics that interprets Q as Q in the way explained by Lindtröm [17] . Taking CInv(S) to consist of all the operations definable in L S , Bonnay argues for the following:
Principle for Closure under Definability. CInv(S) = Inv(S).
This is a strong condition; for example S = Iso ω fails to satisfy it. A counter-example is provided by the "infinitely many" quantifier: it is Iso ω invariant but one construct a quantifier from it that is first order definable but which is not Iso ω invariant. In fact,
Bonnay's main result is the following. In further favor of Iso p as a distinguished similarity relation, Bonnay quotes the following characterization of it due to Barwise in terms of the notion of absoluteness, to be discussed at length in the next section.
THEOREM 6. (Barwise [4] ) Iso p is the greatest S in the ≤ relation that is absolute with respect to ZFC and for which ZFC proves that S ≤ Iso. A similar result can be stated for L ∞,ω using the work of Karp [15] .
Adding absoluteness criteria to isomorphism invariance.
To return to the central question, let's look in more detail at the absoluteness criterion suggested by my critique II of the Tarski-Sher thesis. Let T be a set of axioms in the language of set theory. A formula ϕ of set theory is defined to be absolute w.r.t. to T if ϕ is invariant under endextensions for models of T. It was proved some time ago by Kreisel and me, as strengthened in Feferman [9] , that ϕ is absolute w.r.t. T iff it is Δ rel. to T, i.e. it is provably equivalent to both a ∑ and a ∏ formula rel. to S where here by ∑ (∏) is meant the class of formulas in prenex form in which all unbounded quantifiers are existential (universal). Note well that the notion of being absolute is relative to a system of axioms.
For his proof of the consistency of AC and GCH relative to ZF, Gödel needed to show that a number of notions are absolute relative to that system. It was since established that all those notions are absolute relative to Kripke-Platek set theory KP; below it will be more useful to deal with the slightly weaker system KPU, which allows urelements, and if we speak of absoluteness without explicit reference to a system of axioms, one means relative to KPU. This system includes the Axiom of Infinity, Inf, in the form that guarantees the existence of ω; also, in it (even without Inf) every ∑ (∏) formula is equivalent to a ∑ 1 (∏ 1 ) formula. Among the notions that are absolute w.r.t. KPU are being an ordinal, being ω, and being a formula of FOL true in a structure M. Among those that are not absolute are being an uncountable ordinal, being ω 1 , and being the power set of ω.
For the determination of which operators across domains ought to be counted as logical on the basis of certain absoluteness invariance criteria, it turns out one can make use of results about absolute logics within the framework of abstract model-theory. The general background is explained in the chapters by Ebbinghaus [8] and Flum [12] A logic L is said to be absolute if the sets Sent σ and the |= relation for L are absolute. Barwise [3] initiated the study of absolute logics with his proof that L ∞,ω is the largest logic which is absolute for KP if no restriction is made as to the sets Sent σ . 5 The subject of set-theoretic definability of logics and in particular of absolute logics was extensively surveyed and considerably advanced in the chapter by Väänänen [30] in [5] . A published proof of Theorem 9 is to be found in [30] , pp. 620-622, though the result there (3.1.5) is incorrectly stated for KP−Inf instead of KPU−Inf. 6 Väänänen's proof of this theorem is different from Manders' in that it makes essential use of my notion of adequacy to truth of the notion of one logic L being adequate to truth for another language L′ [10] . Roughly speaking what this means is that the satisfaction relation for L′ for all subformulas of any given formula of L′ is, in a suitable sense, uniformly implicitly invariantly definable in L. L is said to be truth maximal if whenever it is adequate to truth in L′ we have L′ ≤ L. The main results in [10] for that notion were that a logic is truth-maximal iff it has the Δ-interpolation property, and that L ω,ω is truthmaximal among all logics whose sentences are represented in HF. The crucial step in
Väänänen's proof is to push back being absolute w.r.t. KPU−Inf to the Δ-interpolation property.
Relative to any set S of axioms in the language of KPU, an operation Q across domains is said to be absolute if the relation between D and R such that D is a set of urelements and Q D (R) = T is absolute. When Q is preserved under isomorphism, it serves to determine a Lindström quantifier in the sense of [17] . Then we can formally extend the language of FOL by a symbol Q for Q, with its semantics determined by Q. This is easily seen by the fact that the satisfaction relation for L among subformulas of any given formula is Δ in Q w.r.t. S, and that being Δ in Δ definable is equivalent to being Δ definable.
THEOREM 11. If an operation Q across domains is isomorphism invariant and is absolute w.r.t. KPU−Inf then Q is definable in L ω,ω .
By Lemma 10, this is a corollary of Manders' Theorem 9.
CONJECTURE. If an operation Q across domains is homomorphism invariant and is absolute w.r.t. KPU−Inf then Q is definable in FOL -.
6. Discussion. Bonnay [7] presents an interesting analysis of the informal arguments for various set-theoretical invariance criteria for logicality. He formulates the first such, for
Tarski's thesis, in terms of the idea of levels of generality. In the Klein Erlanger Programm, levels of generality of a geometry are distinguished by the levels of generality of the associated groups of transformations. Thus, e.g., affine geometry is more general than Euclidean geometry since the affine transformations are more general than the isometric transformations (as well as the more general similarity transformations).
Continuing in this vein leads one to explaining logic, which is the most general theory of all, in terms of the largest group of transformations, namely the class of permutations on any given domain, and to the identification of the logical notions with those invariant under permutations of the underlying universe. More explicitly as given by Bonnay, the generality argument for Tarski's thesis runs as follows.
G.1 The distinctive feature of logic among other theories is that it is the most general theory one can think of.
G.2 The bigger the group of transformations associated with a theory, the more general the theory.
G.3 The biggest group of transformations is the class of all permutations.
[Hence] proposes the following lack of content argument, to reflect the idea that "logical notions should not encapsulate any problematic set-theoretical content":
LC.1 Logic deals with notions which are deprived of non formal content and of problematic set-theoretic contents.
LC.2 The good notion of invariance for logicality is to be provided by a similarity relation S such that S ≤ Iso.
LC.3 The good notion of invariance for logicality is to be provided by a similarity relation S such that S is absolute with respect to ZFC.
LC. 4 The good notion of invariance for logicality is to be provided by the greatest similarity relation S satisfying LC.2 and LC.3.
[Hence]
The logical notions are the Iso p -invariant notions. ( [7] , p. 60)
In this case, the reasoning is supported by Barwise's Theorem 6 above.
Bonnay returns to the overgeneration problem as a challenge to the Iso p thesis for logicality in his final subsection (4.3). Though cardinality quantifiers like ∃ ≥κ for κ an uncountable cardinal are not logical on this thesis, the quantifier "there exist infinitely many" is. Thence, as Bonnay acknowledges, all arithmetical truths count as logical truths, and "the overgeneration problem is at least eased, if not solved, by the shift from Iso invariance to Iso p -invariance" ( [7] , p.65).
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I don't find either of the modified arguments⎯mild generality and lack of content⎯convincing even with the supporting theorems, and certainly not as compelling on the face of it as the generality and formality arguments for permutation invariance as the criterion for logicality. For one thing, the presumption in both arguments is that invariance is to be expressed in terms of a single, global (or "coarse-grained") similarity relation. 8 Note that condition (ii) is more robust on the set-theoretical side than absoluteness w.r.t.
KPU−Inf as assumed in Theorem 11. Re condition (iii), it is plausible to assume of any system of human logical reasoning, that its sentences are represented in HF and that it makes use of some finite set of effective rules. It follows that the totality of sentences that can be shown to be valid in the given logic constitutes a recursively enumerable set.
Of course it does not follow from that that (iii) must hold, since there is no guarantee that any such system of rules for the semantics that is determined by the given Q is complete.
